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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

V.

:

WENDELL NAVANICK,

:

Case No. 981398-CA
Priority No. 2

De f endant/Appe11ant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for
Possession, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-38-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1998), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Tyrone E. Medley, Judge, presiding.

Jurisdiction is conferred on

this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996).
See Addendum A (judgment).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue:

Did the trial court erroneously deny Appellant's

motion to suppress the controlled substance found on his person
after he was arrested in violation of his Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable search and seizure?
Standard of Review:

A trial court's decision to admit

evidence seized as a result of a search implicating a defendant's
Fourth Amendment right is a "mixed question of law and fact []
appropriately resolved under a bifurcated examination of, first,
the predicate historical facts found by the trial court, weighed
against a clearly erroneous standard, and, second, of the
emerging legal conclusion, evaluated for correctness."

State v.

Vicril. 815 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Utah App. 1991) (discussing bifurcated
standard of review applied to mixed questions of fact and law in
Fourth Amendment context).
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Wendell Navanick7s ("Navanick") challenge to the
admissibility of the evidence is preserved on the record ("R.")
for appeal at 45-62, 290.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
United States Constitution, Amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At a suppression hearing, Navanick moved to exclude evidence
of a controlled substance (amphetamine) that was seized during a
jailhouse search.

R.45-62,290.

The search was conducted after

he was mistakenly arrested under a warrant for another person
with the same name.
motion.

Id.

The trial court denied Navanick's

R.133-38 (findings of fact and conclusions of law), 140.

Navanick entered a conditional guilty plea to possession pursuant
to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988); see also Utah R.
Crim. P. ll(i) (1998).

R.226-31,276.

Navanick appeals the lower

court's denial of his motion to suppress the controlled substance
seized during the jailhouse search.

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 3, 1997, at 7:00 p.m., Salt Lake City Police Officer
Bryan Bailey ("Bailey") received a telephone call from the
manager of the Motel 6 at 600 South, 176 West, in downtown Salt
Lake City.

R.290[8-9].

The manager reported that several young

women were coming and going from a particular room and was
concerned about possible "pimping."

R.290[8].

The manager

indicated that the room, number 148, was registered to a man
named Wendell Navanick, but did not offer any physical or other
descriptive information about him.

R.290[10].

Although Bailey claimed to have had previous "professional
contact" with a Wendell Navanick, Bailey did not look into the
matter further.

R.290[11-12].

Instead, he assigned Officer Todd

Mitchell ("Mitchell") from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Department ("SLCSD") vice unit to investigate.

R.290 [12].

Although Bailey testified that he instructed Mitchell to go to
the Motel 6 at 176 West, 600 South, Mitchell for some unexplained
reason went to a different Motel 6 located at 1990 West North
Temple.

R.290[9,13,15].

Before departing for the motel, Mitchell ran a warrants
check on Wendell Navanick and discovered one outstanding arrest
warrant for telephone harassment issued out of the West Valley
City Police Department ("WVCPD").

R.290[16].

The warrant named

a "Wendall Navanick" (different spelling than Appellant's name)
with a birth date of 11-27-71 and an address of 1985 South, 100
East in Salt Lake City.

R.191 (Addendum B - WVCPD arrest
3

warrant).
In addition to the warrants check, Mitchell testified that
he checked the SLCSD records.

R.290 [16,31] . According to

Mitchell, that record identified two birth dates tied to a single
address but did not provide any physical information.

R.290 [16-

18] . Mitchell never checked with the WVCPD where the warrant
originated to see if their records contained a physical
description that might explain the existence of the two birth
dates, although the department was open and such information
could have been easily accessed.

R.290[34].

Mitchell likewise

failed to contact the SLCSD Information Services Office, also
open at that time, for a physical description.1

R.290 [33-34] .

Mitchell was not otherwise familiar with anyone by the name of
"Wendell Navanick."

R.290[38].

Having verified the warrant, Mitchell set out for the Motel
6 on North Temple accompanied by two other officers.
He did not have the warrant with him.

R.290[30].

directly to room 148 and knocked on the door.
Appellant opened the door.

R.290[21].

R.290 [19] .

He proceeded

R.290[20-21].

Mitchell saw two females

in the room and asked the man to come out.

Id.

The man

identified himself as Wendell Navanick, born 1-7-71.

R.290[22].

He did not have any identification on him when he was approached
by the officers.

R.290[25].

1

Although it is not clear from the record, Mitchell's
testimony indicates that the internal SLCSD records that he
accessed do not provide the same information that is accessible
through the SLCSD Information Services Office.
4

Mitchell informed Navanick that he was under arrest for
telephone harassment and cuffed him.

R.290[22,29].

Navanick

looked perplexed for a moment then informed the officers that
they had the wrong person and that there was another Wendell
Navanick who was probably the man they were after.

R.290[22 # 30].

Not believing Navanick, Mitchell frisked him but found no
contraband.
jail.

R.290 [31].

R.290[23].

Mitchell immediately took Navanick to

Navanick requested that the two women in his

room, his girlfriend and her sister, remain; Mitchell agreed.
Id.

Mitchell testified that other than the arrest warrant, he

did not have probable cause to detain Navanick.

R.290[30].

At the jail, Navanick was undergoing a standard jailhouse
search incident to arrest when the booking officer informed
Mitchell that there may be two Navanicks and that the warrant may
be for another person than the one arrested.

R.290 [24,25,27,37] .

Mitchell did not cease the search however, and a small quantity
of amphetamine was thereafter found on Navanick.

R.290[45].

The

substance was received into evidence and Navanick was booked for
possession.

R.290[64],203

(Addendum C - SLCSD booking sheet).

Navanick was never booked for or charged with telephone
harassment, the crime listed in the warrant.

Id.

Navanick moved to suppress the amphetamine found during the
jailhouse search.

R.45-62,290.

Specifically, Navanick asserted

that the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to the extent
that the police proceeded unreasonably on the warrant for
telephone harassment despite several indications that they had
5

the wrong individual.

Id.

Navanick further argued that Mitchell

was obliged to take more measures to verify the identity of the
subject named in the warrant.

Id.

The State countered that Mitchell took adequate measures to
clarify the identity of the warrant's subject and, in any event,
the evidence did not conclusively rule out the possibility that
Navanick was not the intended subject of the warrant.

R.290 [80].

To this end, the State cross-examined Navanick about his legal
name, John Gutierrez, intimating that he sought to avoid arrest
on this occasion by giving police the name "Navanick."

R.290 [45-

52] .
Navanick confirmed that his legal name is John Gutierrez,
and that his social security number and all his affairs requiring
his legal name (i.e. school records) are under that name.
R.290 [46-47] . He explained that his mother changed his name
while he was still an infant to Wendell Navanick, Jr., shortly
after she started dating Wendell Navanick, Sr., although
Navanick, Sr., is not his biological father.

R.290[46].

Ever

since that time, Navanick has always been known as Navanick, Jr.
and, hence, gave that name to the police on the evening of July
3, 1997.

R.290 [48] .

Appellant also testified that there is a second Navanick,
Jr., also named after Navanick, Sr., born 11-27-71, and who is
the subject of the telephone harassment warrant.

R.290[51-52].

According to Appellant, he has never met the other Navanick, Jr.,
but knows that he lives in the Salt Lake City area.
6

R.290 [48] .

Appellant also testified that he has been confused by the police
for the other Navanick, Jr. on one prior occasion.

Id.

The court denied Navanick's motion to suppress.

In so

holding, it found that Navanick did not have any identification
on him when arrested; that Mitchell took sufficient, reasonable
steps to clarify the identity of the subject named in the
warrant; that the officers had a valid warrant and reasonably
believed they were arresting the individual intended in the
warrant; that the evidence presented at the hearing was
inconclusive as to whether the appellant was the subject of the
warrant due to credibility issues arising from his conflicting
testimony regarding his name, i.e. Gutierrez or Navanick; and,
finally, under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-11 (1995), see infra note 5,
and Hill, it is not mandatory that officers take any other
measures than those taken by Mitchell to clarify doubt regarding
an individual named in a warrant.

R.133-38 (Addendum D -

findings of fact and conclusions of law).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Navanick's motion to
suppress evidence seized as a result of a jailhouse search
incident to his arrest.

Specifically, the arresting officer,

acting pursuant to an arrest warrant, did not reasonably mistake
Navanick for the actual, intended subject of the warrant.
Accordingly, the arrest was executed in violation of Navanick's
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, and the
evidence obtained as a result is inadmissible.
7

ARGUMENT
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING NAVANICK'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO AN ARREST CONDUCTED IN
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WHERE THE ARRESTING
OFFICER DID NOT REASONABLY MISTAKE NAVANICK FOR THE SUBJECT
OF THE WARRANT.
The trial court erred in admitting the evidence seized as a
result of the mistaken arrest of Navanick.

Specifically, Officer

Mitchell's error in arresting Navanick was not reasonable under
the circumstances.

Hence, the arrest is invalid under the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and the evidence
seized thereto is inadmissible.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of all individuals
to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
See also Utah Const. Art. I, § 14 (securing the right against
"unreasonable searches and seizures," requiring warrants based on
"probable cause"). 2
Evidence seized as a result of an arrest executed in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible under the
doctrine of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree ("exclusionary
rule").

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83

S.Ct. 407, 415-16, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); see also State v.
Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 1195 (Utah 1995) (noting that in Utah

2

Appellant's discussion herein shall be
analysis under the Federal Constitution.
8

limited

to an

"[t]he fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, as enunciated in
Wong Sun, [citation omitted], requires the exclusion at trial of
evidence obtained through a violation of the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments").

The government bears the burden to show that an

arrest is valid under the Fourth Amendment.

See State v.

Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Utah App. 1991).
The Fourth Amendment is implicated when, as in the present
case, "the police purposely detain a person under the mistaken
impression that he is someone else."

Vathekan v. Prince George's

County, 1998 WL 544765 *4 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Brower v.
County of Invo, 489 U.S. 593, 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d
628 (1989)).

The rule regarding mistaken arrests was set forth

by the United States Supreme Court in Hill v. California, 401
U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971):

The mistaken

arrest of an individual is not valid under the Fourth Amendment
unless 1) the arrest was justified at its inception by probable
cause3 and 2) the officers' mistake was reasonable and made in
good faith.

401 U.S. at 802.4

Where officers act pursuant to a facially valid arrest
warrant, the probable cause prong of the Hill analysis is

3

A seizure cannot be retroactively justified by evidence
obtained as a result of the seizure itself. See United States v.
Delcradillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1298 (9th Cir. 1988).
4

The Utah Code likewise requires that an arrest pursuant to
a warrant be reasonable.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-11 (1995)
provides, "[a]ny peace officer who has knowledge of an outstanding
warrant of arrest may arrest a person he reasonably
believes
to be
the person
described
in the warrant,
without the peace officer
having physical possession of the warrant." (emphasis added).
9

satisfied.

The question then becomes "whether it was

reasonable

for the arresting officers to believe that the person arrested
was the one sought."

Gero v. Henault, 740 F.2d 78, 84-85 (1st

Cir. 1984) (citing Hill, 401 U.S. at 804) .5 As explained by the
5

The trial court found that the warrant was valid. R.137.
Navanick, however, does not concede its validity. A valid warrant
under the Fourth Amendment must particularly describe the person to
be arrested. See West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 14 S.Ct. 752, 38
L.Ed. 643 (18 94).
Whether a warrant meets the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment "depends upon the particular
circumstances" of each case. State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 972
(Utah App. 1989) (discussing particularity requirements for search
warrants) (citing State v. Anderson, 701 P. 2d 1099, 1102 (Utah
1985)). Generally, a warrant that correctly names the arrestee is
adequate. See Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 645 (7th Cir.
1981) . However, a warrant that incorrectly names the subject is
not valid unless accompanying affidavits provide additional
information that clarifies his or her identity. Id.
In the present case, the warrant did not correctly name the
arrestee to the extent that it misspelled the name as "Wendall
Navanick;" the correct spelling is "Wendell." R.191. Moreover,
the warrant was not accompanied by any information, such as an
affidavit, that could cure the deficit in information identifying
the subject of the warrant.
Id.
Although the warrant itself
provided a birth date and address, as discussed herein, neither
piece of information conformed to other information obtained by the
officer (i.e. - Mitchell was sent to a different address than the
one listed on the warrant, R.290[9,13,15] , and the birth date was
contradicted by another one indicated in a record referenced by
Mitchell, R.290[16-18]). Accordingly, under the circumstances, the
warrant did not adequately describe the arrestee with sufficient
particularity to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
As noted in Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373 (D.C. App.
1975), where, as in the present case,
an agent of the state makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant
(assuming no independent probable cause), and the warrant
fails, the arrest also must fail, for the agent's authority to
make a proper arrest dies with the warrant. Good faith or
reasonableness on the part of the arresting officer cannot
remedy such an infirmity.
Id. at 377 (citing Hill, 401 U.S. at 804) . The arrest at issue
here fails since the warrant is invalid and Mitchell, as he himself
admitted, did not have probable cause to arrest Navanick that
existed independently of the warrant.
R.290[30].
Furthermore,
even assuming Mitchell exercised good faith in executing this
10

Hill Court, "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the
touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment."
U.S. at 803.

401

Moreover, reasonableness is assessed in light of

the totality of the circumstances.

Id.6

Under the foregoing analysis, the Hill Court held that
officers acted reasonably when they arrested a person mistaken
for petitioner Hill and seized evidence in a search incident to

arrest, such would not be enough for the arrest to survive the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure; Mitchell's "authority to make a proper arrest die[d] with
the warrant." Sanders, 339 A.2d at 377.
In addition to the foregoing, another aspect of this case
undermines the validity of Navanick's arrest. In United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the
Supreme Court established the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, upholding the admissibility of evidence seized
as a result of an officer's reasonable reliance upon a search
warrant that later turned out to be invalid. 468 U.S. at 925-26.
In so holding, however, the Court expressly noted that the
exception would not apply where a "warrant [is] so facially
deficient - i.e., in failing to particularize the place [or person]
to be searched or the things to be seized - that the executing
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." Id. at 923.
The hypothetical scenario envisioned by the Leon Court is the
reality in the present case. Under the circumstances here and for
reasons discussed above, the information provided in the warrant is
"facially deficient" in that it fails to "particularize" the person
to be arrested. Id. Hence, Mitchell could not "reasonably presume
it to be valid."
In acting on an obviously deficient warrant,
Mitchell did not exercise good faith, and therefore the
exclusionary rule applies to this case. Id. at 925-26.
Yet, even assuming the validity of the warrant and/or
Mitchell's good faith reliance thereon, the arrest is still illegal
under the Fourth Amendment given the unreasonableness of the
mistaken arrest of Navanick. See discussion infra.
6

"Totality of the circumstances" includes assessment of such
factors as the "adequacy of the description of the suspect, time
and place of arrest, and [the arresting officer's] action in the
period immediately following the arrest", United States v. Valez,
796 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1986), and the particular exigencies of the
situation. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 79 F.3d 68, 69
(3d Cir. 1996).
11

arrest that later led to Hill's conviction.

401 U.S. at 806.

In

that case, two robbery suspects implicated Hill and gave police
information about Hill's address, age, appearance, the make of
his car, and the presence of stolen goods in his apartment.
at 799.

Id.

Four officers went to the address indicated and found a

person matching Hill's description.

In fact, the person was

Archie Miller, who was waiting for Hill at the apartment.
Miller was arrested and asked about the contraband.

Id.

Id.
Miller

said he was not Hill and claimed no knowledge of the stolen
property, although guns and ammunition were sitting nearby in
plain view.

Id.

Miller produced identification confirming his

name, however the officers were not convinced and proceeded to
search the premises.

Id.

Based on the evidence found as a result of the search, Hill
was tried and found guilty of robbery.

Id. at 800.

The trial

court held the evidence admissible on the basis that the officers
reasonably mistook Miller for Hill and the evidence was
discovered pursuant to a valid search incident to arrest.

Id.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, stating "the police were
entitled to do what the law would have allowed them to do if
Miller had in fact been Hill, that is, to search incident to
arrest and seize evidence of the crime the police had probable
cause to believe Hill had committed."

Id. at 804.

In affirming the reasonableness of the mistaken arrest, the
Court noted that the officers had probable cause to arrest Hill
based on the informants' information, which included an address
12

and a "verified description" that coincided with the address and
appearance of Miller.

Id. at 802-03.

The Court also found it

significant that Miller denied knowledge of contraband even
though guns and ammunition were sitting nearby.

Id. at 803.

Finally, with regard to Miller's proffer of identification, the
Court stated that "aliases and false identifications are not
uncommon" and, in light of his "evasive" answers regarding
contraband in plain view, his "subsequent production of
identification [was] entitled to little weight."

Id. at 803,

n.9.
The instant case is distinguishable from Hill in that
numerous factors bear against the reasonableness of the officers'
mistaken arrest of Navanick and render the trial court's decision
to admit the evidence an abuse of discretion.

As an initial

matter, Mitchell did not have the sort of corroborated
information and "verified description" of the warrant's subject
that rendered the officer's mistake in Hill reasonable.
at 802-03.

401 U.S.

Rather, the warrant and accompanying records provided

conflicting information that left the identity of the subject
substantially in question.
For example, the WVCPD warrant indicated that the subject
had a birth date of 11-27-71.

R.191.

The SLCSD records accessed

by Mitchell, on the other hand, gave two birth dates, 11-27-71
and 1-7-71.7

CJL. United States v. Valez, 796 F.2d 24, 26 (2d

7

According to Mitchell, the two birth dates were linked to
a single address in the past and were characterized as aliases.
Over Navanick's objection, the State was not compelled to produce
13

Cir. 1986) (citing Hill and noting that assessment of surrounding
circumstances includes in part the "adequacy of the description
of the suspect").

Moreover, Mitchell was dispatched to a Motel 6

rather than the address listed on the warrant.

Cf. Hill, 401

U.S. at 802-03 (officer found mistaken arrestee at exact address
provided by informant).
Where most of the information on the warrant (birth date and
address) was contradicted by other information, the primary
justification for upholding the finding of reasonableness and the
admiss ion of the evidence articulated in Hill, namely the
corroborating information and "verified description" of the
suspect, is lacking.

Accordingly, the trial court erred finding

that Mitchell reasonably mistook Navanick for the intended
subject.
In addition to the contradicted information in the warrant,
Mitchell's unreasonableness in this case is underscored by the
fact that he did not make any attempts to clarify the identity of
the warrant's subject despite the obvious discrepancies.

Where

an officer has doubt that he is in pursuit of the right person,
he "must make immediate reasonable efforts to confirm the
suspect's identity."

United States v. Glover, 725 F.2d 120, 123

(C.A.D.C. 1984).
"Immediate reasonable efforts," indeed common sense, under
the circumstances would have entailed a simple telephone call to

a written copy of the record referred to by Mitchell
therefore, this information could not be cross-examined.
14

and,

either the SLCSD Information Services Office or the WVCPD Records
Department.

In so doing, Mitchell could have immediately

obtained a physical description of a Wendell Navanick, D.O.B. 1127-71, on the evening in question (7:30 p.m., July 3, 1997).
R.201,211 (affidavits from WVCPD Records Department and SLCSD
Information Services Office respectively regarding availability
of descriptive information).
In the present case, however, Mitchell did not take
"reasonable efforts," Glover, 725 F.2d at 123, because he only
accessed an internal SLCSD record that did not provide a physical
description.

R.290[31].

He did not call the SLCSD Information

Services Officer, an entity organized to provide such
information, nor did he contact the WVCPD Records Department
although the warrant was generated by the WVCPD.
The unreasonableness of Mitchell's inaction is underscored
given that he had both the time and ability to make such a call.
Mitchell testified that he was at the station when he received
the call to investigate the matter at the Motel 6.

Hence, he

must have had immediate access to a telephone from whence he
could call for a physical description of the man named in the
warrant.

Cf. Valez, 796 F.2d at 27 (mistaken arrest reasonable

even though officer did not elicit physical description of
suspect; officer only had access to radio in police van and could
not communicate with other officers in field who could verify
identity).

Moreover, the evidence does not suggest that there

was an extreme rush to apprehend Navanick, i.e., Navanick was at
15

a motel rather than in a moving vehicle or on the run.

Cf.

Patton v. Przvbvlski, 822 F.2d 697, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1987)
(suspect in car and may have escaped had officer stopped to read
all information on police report before apprehending him). Where
the information on the warrant was discrepant, and where
Mitchell had both the information and time at his disposal to
obtain a physical description of the warrant's subject, he did
not make adequately "reasonable efforts" to clarify the identity
of the subject.

Glover, 725 F.2d at 123.

Indeed, the information available to Mitchell would have
clarified that he did not have the man named in the warrant.
That person was described in the WVCPD incident report and other
records as 5'7" to 6'00" tall, "non-Hispanic" or "Indian," and
approximately 140-50 pounds.

R.196-200 (WVCPD incident report),

207 (Utah criminal history record), 212 (SLCSD booking record).
Appellant, by contrast, is Hispanic, only 5'5" tall, and weighs
226 pounds, a difference of several inches and nearly seventyfive pounds.

R.203 (SLCSD booking record)8; cf. Glover, 725

F.2d at 122-23 (reasonable mistake where arrestee resembled
description of suspect); United States v. McEachern, 675 F.2d
618, 621 (4th Cir. 1982) (same).

Where Mitchell failed to take

the simple step toward identity verification by accessing

8

Bailey nor the Motel 6 manager that initially called in
about the appellant did not offer any physical description that
Mitchell could compare such information to prior to meeting him in
person. However, the difference in weight and height would have
alerted Mitchell that he had the wrong person once he met Navanick
at the motel before he took him into custody.
16

information readily available by phone, the trial court erred in
finding the mistaken arrest to be reasonable.
Beyond the questions arising from proceeding on the warrant
under these circumstances, the events that occurred during the
arrest and at the jailhouse also undermine the reasonableness of
Mitchell's error.

Mitchell testified that when he initially

approached Navanick at the Motel 6 and announced that he was
under arrest for telephone harassment, Navanick appeared confused
and protested that Mitchell had the wrong guy.9

R.290[22,30].

Navanick also urged Mitchell to compare his social security
number ("SSN") with that of the man named in the warrant.
R.290 [42] .
The instant case is distinguishable from Hill, where the
mistaken arrestee similarly told the police that he was not the
man they were after and even produced identification to that
effect.

401 U.S. at 799.

In that case, the Court stated that

the arrestee's claim of innocence was "entitled to little weight"
because he gave "evasive" answers to police questions and
disingenuously claimed no knowledge of obvious contraband lying
in plain view.

Id. at 803.

Mitchell should have heeded Navanick's protest since the
evidence presented at the hearing in the instant case, by
9

In fact, there are two people named Wendell Navanick, Jr.
See R.206 (Addendum E - photo of appellant, born 1-7-71, taken
night of arrest at issue) ; 211 (Addendum E - photo of second
Wendell Navanick, Jr., born 11-27-71, when arrested for possession
in February, 1993) (originals in exhibits envelope included in
record).
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contrast, did not indicate that Navanick's actions were suspect.
In fact, contrary to Hill, Mitchell admitted that he did not
observe any suspicious or evasive behavior to the extent that he
testified that he did not have probable cause to arrest Navanick
for the alleged prostitution.

R.290[30].

Mitchell also

testified that he did not find any weapons or contraband on
Navanick when he frisked him at the motel.

R.290[31].

The exigencies of the situation, moreover, did not warrant
discounting Navanick's statement.

According to Mitchell, he was

accompanied by two other officers.

With three officers total on

the scene, one could have easily called in about the SSN while
the other two watched Navanick.

Cf., Patton v. Przvbylski, 822

F.2d 697, 698-700 (7th Cir. 1987) (exigency of situation,
combined with risk of nighttime highway arrest executed by an
officer acting alone, rendered mistaken arrest reasonable despite
arrestee's claim that officer had the wrong person).

Where

Navanick was contained and outnumbered by officers, and where the
particular situation did not present the risk of flight or
physical danger, Mitchell was not reasonable in discounting
Navanick's statements.

Indeed, had Mitchell taken the time to

check the aforementioned records of the WVCPD and the SLCSD, he
would have discovered that the subject's SSN was different than
Navanick's.

Compare R.197 (WVCPD incident report providing

warrant subject's SSN) with R.203 (SLCSD booking report providing
appellant's SSN).
Other more telling indications of the unreasonableness of
18

the mistaken arrest, and indeed Mitchell's bad faith dealings in
this matter, is that an officer at the jail notified Mitchell, as
Mitchell conducted the pat-down search that later revealed the
amphetamine, that there may be two people by the same name.
R.290 [24,25,27,37] . However, without stopping to verify that
Navanick was in fact the person named in the warrant, Mitchell
carried on with the search until he found the substance.

Id.

In

so doing, Mitchell failed to carry out his duty to immediately
dispel doubts that he may have as to the identity of the subject
of a warrant.

See supra Glover, 725 F.2d at 123 (where officer

has doubt as to identity of arrestee, he or she "must make
immediate reasonable efforts to confirm the suspect's identity").
A final and telling aspect of this case highlighting Mitchell's
bad faith is that Navanick was never booked for or charged with
telephone harassment, the crime set forth in the warrant.

R.203,

290 [64] .
In light of the foregoing considerations, the trial court
erred in finding the mistaken arrest of Navanick to be
reasonable.

The evidence highlights that Mitchell did not act

with a "sufficient probability" that he had the right man named
in the warrant when he arrested Navanick.

Hill, 401 U.S. at 802.

Indeed, a number of factors indicate his bad faith dealings in
this matter.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in admitting

evidence seized as a result of a search incident to arrest
conducted in violation of Navanick's Fourth Amendment rights.

19

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Navanick respectfully requests this
court to reverse the trial court's decision and remand the case
for further proceedings.
SUBMITTED this

%-LL day of January, 1999.

3
CATHERINE L. BEGIC
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

RALPH DELLAPIANA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
S ENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 971015158 FS

WENDELL NAVANICK,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

TYRONE E. MEDLEY
July 13, 1998

PRESENT
Clerk:
daleeng
Prosecutor: NICK DALESANDRO
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): RALPH DELLAPIANA
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 7, 1971
Video
CHARGES
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 05/18/1998 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

Page 1

Case No: 971015158
Date:
Jul 13, 1998

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$625.00
$0.00
$531.25
$1156.25

Total Fine: $625.00
Total Suspended: $0
Total Surcharge: $531.25
Total Amount Due: $1156.2 5
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 1 year(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail.
Defendant is to report on July 15, 1998 at 3.00 p.m..
Defendant is to pay a fine of $1156.25 where the surcharge has been
added to the fine.
Pay fine to THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Violate no laws.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Page 2

Case No: 971015158
Date:
Jul 13, 1998
Enter and complete inpatient substance abuse program (ATC ,
salvation army or as by AP&P with aftercare.
Receive vocational rehabilitation.
Complete GED.
Maintain full time employment/schooling.
Release to AP&P for transportation to a drug program when a bed
space is available.
ORAL ARGUMENT MOTION TO STAY is scheduled.
Date: 07/15/1998
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W46
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
4 50 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Dated this

Yb day

of

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third
District Court at 238-7300 at least three working days prior to the
proceeding. The general information phone number is (801)238-7300.

sag*
OFAN
•STATE

Page 3

(last)

ADDENDUM B

UV Dept

JfiN 26 *S

ID:%?-985?

13:33 No.005 P.CP

Keith L. Stoney (3868)
David L. Clark (6199)
John W. Huber (7226)
West V a l l e y City Prosecutors
3600 C o n s t i t u t i o n Boulevard
West V a l l e y City, UT 84119
(801) 963-3331

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATS OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, TOST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH (WVC)
Plaintiff,

WARRANT OF ARREST

v.

Bail $ I^OTt^

WENDALL HAYAHICX
1985 SOUTH 200 EAST
SLC UT 84115
11/27/71

Case No. 961002627

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss.

TO ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHALL OR POLICE OFFICER IN THE STATE;
Information, upon oath, having been made, by DAVID L. CLARK, that the
offense(s) of has or have been committed, and accusing WENDALL NAVANICX
thereof.
You are therefore commanded to arrest the above-named KENDALL
and bring Defendant before said Court forthwith.

NAVANICK

WITNESS,, The Honorable Judge of the above entitled Court.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
VICITM, ' PAUL MILLER, STATED TO OFFICERS THAT THE DEFENDANT, WITH THE
INTENT TO ANNOY, ALARM, OFFEND, INTIMIDATE, HARASS, THREATEN OR FRIGHTEN HIM,
CALLED HIM ON THE TELEPHONE AND THREATENED TO DO BODILY'INJURY TO HIM AND USED
FOUL AND ABUSIVE LANGUAGE TOWARD HIM; THE DEFENDMHyj^IIJED TO APPEAR FOR
ARRAIGNMENT WITH JUDGE NEHRING. SUMMONS WAS
THEREFORE THE COURT
ORDERED THE CITY TO PREPAR^ WARRANT OF ARRE
DATED this

day of

1997.

*JXOMPL*IM
SUB1

rBED and SWORN to before me VkX
1997,
\2x
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ADDENDUM D

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
N. M. D'ALESANDRO, Bar No. 4818
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

hAtf 1 0 1998

By

lYrfA
<a^

Deputy Clark

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CaseNo.971015158FS

-V-

WENDELL NAVANICK,
Hon. Tyrone E. Medley
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress, filed in the above-entitled matter, came on for
hearing before the Court on February 20, 1998. Defendant was present and was
represented by his counsel, Ralph Dellapiana, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, and
the State of Utah was represented by N. M. D'Alesandro, Deputy District Attorney.
Defendant moved to suppress the search and seizure of amphetamine, a controlled
substance, on the grounds that it was seized pursuant to an illegal arrest and search. More
specifically, defendant argued that the police did not have a facially valid warrant nor
probable cause to arrest the defendant. Defendant further argued that even if the arrest
warrant that the police relied upon in arresting defendant was facially valid, his was a

case of mistaken identity caused by the failure of the police to take reasonable steps to
confirm the identity of the person sought in the warrant.
Having considered the motion, memorandum, and reply brief filed by the
defendant, the memorandum filed by the State, oral argument, exhibits admitted into
evidence, the sworn testimony of witnesses, including the defendant, Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Deputy Brenda Christensen, Salt Lake City Police Officers Bryan Bailey and
Todd Mitchell, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Defendant is charged by Information with one count of Unlawful Possession of
a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony.
2. Defendant is alleged to have been in possession of amphetamine, a Schedule II
controlled substance.
3. The Information is based on activities that took place on July 3, 1997, at a
Motel 6 at 1990 West North Temple and at the Metro Jail in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
4. On July 3, 1997, while on duty, Salt Lake City Police Detective Bryan Bailey
received a telephone call from the manager of a Motel 6 in Salt Lake City reporting
suspicious activity in room 148.
5. The manager told the police that a "Wendell Navanick" was registered in room
148.

6.

Detective Bailey, busy with another matter, asked Salt Lake City Police

Detective Todd Mitchell to investigate.
7. Detective Mitchell called police dispatch by telephone and asked them to
check the name "Wendell Navanick" for warrants.
8. The dispatcher informed Detective Mitchell that there was a warrant for a
person with that name and the date of birth of 11/27/71.
9. An arrest warrant for "Wendall Navanick," with an address of "1985 South
200 East, SLC, UT 84115," date of birth "11/27/71," on a charge of telephone harassment
was signed by Judge Judith Atherton, Third District Court, West Valley Department, on
May 7, 1997.
10. Bail on the warrant was set at $1000.00.
11. No physical description was provided on the warrant.
12. Detective Mitchell checked the police department's computerized records and
determined that there were two dates of birth associated with the name Wendell
Navanick, 11/27/71, and an alias date of birth of 1/7/71.
13. Detective Mitchell went to room 148 of the Motel 6, 1990 West North
Temple, at approximately 7:00 p.m. on July 3, 1997.
14. The door to room 148 opened and two women and a man were seen inside.
15. The man inside the room was identified as the defendant, Wendell Navanick.

16. An officer accompanying Detective Mitchell recognized the man in room 148
as Wendell Navanick.
17. Defendant told Detective Mitchell that his date of birth was 1/7/71, which
was consistent with the information that Detective Mitchell had obtained from police
records.
18. Defendant was informed of the warrant and denied that he was the person
named in the warrant.
19. Defendant's testimony was not credible.
20. Defendant had no identification to show to the police.
21. Although "Wendell Navanick" is an uncommon name, at least two persons by
that name, including the defendant, have been booked into the Salt Lake County Jail.
22. Defendant had used names other than Wendell Navanick in the past.
23. Detective Mitchell stated that suspects often gave him false names and dates
of birth.
24. Defendant was arrested on the warrant and taken to the Salt Lake Metro Jail
in Salt Lake County.
25. During a routine booking search of the defendant's pockets, a correctional
officer allegedly found a plastic twist containing amphetamine.
26. No search warrant had been issued prior to the booking search.

8. There are insufficient facts to suggest that the police were required to have
employed any other efforts to confirm the identity of the defendant than the efforts they
diil in lad cmplu'i

defendant w as la^ \ fii ill;; arrested.
..-King searcl

• ii recognized euepiii

in tin ^*au In i\.nraiit

requirement.
Defendant was lawfully searched.
11 ni >r M j spected amphetamine was lawfully seized.
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• 1998.

BY IHJbUJl

ONE E. MEDLEY, Judge
Approved as to form; t//^A ex cepfr0r>f

Ralph Dellapiana
Attorney for Defendant
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